Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

RICHARD DEE THOMAS, Plaintiff and
Appellant, v. PETE HAUN, et al., Defendants and
Appellees : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham, Debra J. Moore; attorneys for appellees.
Richard Dee Thomas; Pro-Se.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Thomas v. Haun, No. 920875 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3880

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

^r

7

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 920875-CA
Priority 15

v.
PETE HAUN, et al.,
Defendants and
Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal from a Final Order of Dismissal of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
DEBRA J. MOORE (4095)
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650
Attorneys for Appellee
RICHARD DEE THOMAS
Pro se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

APR 1 9 1993

J.
K

MaryT Noonan
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 920875-CA
Priority 15
PETE HAUN, et al..
Defendants and
Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal from a Final Order of Dismissal of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
DEBRA J. MOORE (4095)
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650
Attorneys for Appellee
RICHARD DEE THOMAS
Pro se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW . .

1

DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

NATURE OF THE CASE

2

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DISMISSING THOMAS'S COMPLAINT WITHOUT
LEAVE TO AMEND

CONCLUSION

6
12

Addenda
Addendum A

Determinative or Important Provisions

Addendum B

Complaint, R. 2-38.

Addendum C

Order of Dismissal
1992, R. 63

Addendum D

Thomas v. Anaerhofer. No. 91-C-1283S (D.
Utah), Report and Recommendation dated
March 9, 1992

Addendum E

Thomas v. Angerhofer. No. 91-C-1283S (D.
Utah), Order dated April 28, 1992

Addendum F

Thomas v. Angerhofer. No. 92-4072, slip
op. (10th Cir. December 8, 1992)

Addendum G

Thomas v. Angerhofer. No. 91-C-1283S (D.
Utah), Complaint filed December 16, 1991
i

dated October 28,

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
Branum v. Clark. 927 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1991)

6, 7

Campbell v. Mercer. 926 F.2d 990 (10th Cir.
1991)

10

Debry v. Valley Mortgage Co.. 835 P.2d 1000
(Utah App. 1992)

1

Denton v. Hernandez.
1728 (1992)

9

U.S.

, 112 S. Ct.

Dock v. Latimer. 729 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir.),
cert, denied. 469 U.S. 885 (1984)

10

Duhart v. Carlson. 469 F.2d 471 (10th Cir.
1972), cert, denied. 410 U.S. 958 (1973)
Eldridge v. Block. 832 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1987). . . .
Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734
(Utah 1991)
Houtz v. Deland. 718 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Utah
1989)
Jacobs. Visconsi & Jacobs. Co. v. City of
Lawrence. 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991)
Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson. 831 P.2d 86
(1992)

7
1, 6, 7
10
10
10
1

Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas. 121 Utah 457,
243 P.2d 441 (1952)

6

Meade v. Grubbs. 841 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988)
Moore v. Estelle. 526 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied. 426 U.S. 953 (1976)
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc.. 786 P.2d
1350 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138
(1990)
Rizzo v. Goode. 423 U.S. 362 (1976)

ii

11
7
8
11

West Farms Assocs. v. State Traffic Comm/n. 951
F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1991), cert, denied.
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 1671 (1992)

10, 11

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

2, 5, 9

42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 (1986) (amended Nov. 21,
1992)
42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (1986)

2
2, 3

42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3) (1989)

2

42 U.S.C.S. § 1986 (1989)

2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 K b )

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j)
Utah R. Evid. 201

1
2, 7

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11

3

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15

7

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

:

v*

:

PETE HAUN, et al.,

Case No. 920875-CA
Priority 15

:

Defendants and
Appellees.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this matter is conferred upon this
Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) , providing for jurisdiction
in the court of appeals over cases transferred from the Supreme
Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

granting the defendant's motion to dismiss Thomas's complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted without
allowing him the opportunity to amend.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's decision whether to
allow an amended complaint is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
££• Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92-93 (1992)
(reviewing denial of motion for leave to amend); Debry v. Vallev

Mortgage Co. . 835 P.2d 1000# 1008-09 (Utah App. 1992) (same). See
also Eldridge v. Block. 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987)
(reviewing dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)).1
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS
Addendum A to this Brief contains the complete text of
the following provisions:
Utah R. Evid.
28 U.S.C.S. §
42 U.S.C.S. §
42 U.S.C.S. §
42 U.S.C.S. §
42 U.S.C.S. §

201
1915(d) (1989)
1981 (1986) (amended Nov. 21, 1992)
1983 (1986)
1985(3) (1989)
1986 (1989)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order dated October 28,
1992 of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah,
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, dismissing plaintiff's
civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Thomas, an inmate of the Utah State Prison, commenced
this action by filing his complaint on July 30, 1992. R. 2-38. In

Thomas also apparently challenges the dismissal of his
complaint on the ground that it was based on an unsigned minute
entry. This contention is simply factually incorrect and therefore
is not further addressed in this Brief. A copy of the Order of
Dismissal signed by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick and dated
October 28, 1992 is contained in Addendum C to this Brief. R. 63.
2

addition to naming the Attorney General2, the complaint purported
to name as parties defendant nine members of the Utah Board of
Pardons, two employees of the Utah Department of Corrections, and
a district court judge.

However, Thomas served process only upon

the Attorney General and no other defendant made an appearance in
the action.

R. 43.

On September 1, 1992, the Attorney General filed a motion
to

dismiss

the

complaint

on

the

grounds

that

(1) Thomas's

allegations were incomprehensible and conclusory and therefore
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, (2) in
a representative capacity, the Attorney General was not a "person"
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (3) the complaint did
not allege any personal participation of the Attorney General in
any conduct that allegedly caused Thomas to suffer constitutional
harm and therefore the Attorney General was not liable under § 1983
in a personal capacity.

The motion also sought an award of

attorney fees under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
R. 44-52.
On September 9, 1992, Thomas filed an "answer" to and
motion to strike the Attorney General's motion to dismiss. R. 54.
One month later, on October 9, 1992, the district court made a
minute entry granting the motion to dismiss "for the reasons
2

Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
General Graham is automatically substituted for her predecessor R.
Paul Van Dam to the extent he was sued in his official capacity.
The caption of Thomas's complaint purports to bring suit against
Van Dam in both his personal and official capacities. To the
extent former General Van Dam may be deemed a party, this brief is
also filed on his behalf.
3

specified in the memorandum in support thereof, " but denying
attorney fees.

R. 59.

An order of dismissal was entered on

October 28, 1992, nearly two months after the motion to dismiss was
filed.
appeal.

R.

60.

On October 30# 1992, Thomas filed his notice of

R. 65.
Statement of Facts
The allegations of the complaint consist of conclusory

generalizations with few factual allegations. Paragraph 23 is the
only portion of the complaint that contains any allegations against
the Attorney General specifically.

It alleges that the Attorney

General "is in violation of plaintiff's Constitutional Right to
Credit [for] time served" and that the Attorney General "was aware,
had knowledge that a conspiracy [to deprive Thomas of his civil
rights] was about to be committed, and having the power to prevent
or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglect [sic] or
refuses to do so."

R. 11.

Thomas further alleges that he wrote

letters to the Attorney General, "notifying him of credit time
[sic]

served

which

misinformation."

he

ignored,

and

also

informed

him

of

R. 12.

In addition, Thomas appears to complain

of various

alleged procedural due process violations in the conduct of a
parole rescission proceeding against him in October 1990, R. 5-6;
and of an alleged conspiracy among members of the Board of Pardons
to deprive Thomas of equal protection of the law by denying him
credit for time served. R. 7-8. He appears to collaterally attack
a habeas corpus proceeding before Judge Sawaya of the Third
4

Judicial District Court. R. 8-10. He appears to again allege the
denial of credit for time served and procedural due process in
proceedings before the Board of Pardons in November 1991, R. 10;
and he alleges that the two named Department

of Corrections

employees denied his "constitutionally protected liberty interest,"
apparently in allegedly refusing to "procure Board of Pardons
hearing to receive credit for time served."

R. 13.

Thomas's claims are brought under federal civil rights
provisions 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981#

1983, 1985(3) and 1986.

The

complaint does not purport to state any state law claims.
In a previous action in federal district court, Thomas
filed a civil rights complaint against the same defendants, based
upon the same operative facts. The court dismissed that complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) for lack of any arguable merit. Addenda
D, E, F and G.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The

trial

court

did

not

abuse

its

discretion

in

dismissing Thomas's complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted without granting Thomas leave to amend.
Thomas was on notice of the deficiencies in his complaint and had
more than ample opportunity to amend his complaint before the
dismissal was entered.

In addition, this was at least the second

attempt of Thomas to frame a cognizable claim for the violation of
his federal civil rights, his previous federal action having been
dismissed for lack of any arguable merit.

In any event, Thomas's

claims related to the conduct of hearings by the Board of Pardons,
5

in which Thomas has no federal constitutional rights and over which
the Utah Attorney General has no authority or control.

Thus, he

could not possibly state a valid claim for the violation of his
federal civil rights against the Utah Attorney General and his
complaint was therefore properly dismissed. The order of dismissal
below should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THOMAS'S
COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
Thomas appears to contend that the trial court abused its
discretion in dismissing Thomas's complaint rather than allowing
him the opportunity to amend.3

Federal courts have held that a

plaintiff should ordinarily be given leave to amend a complaint to
correct any deficiencies in pleading. See, e.g. . Branum v. Clark.
927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); Eldridae v. Block. 832 F.2d
1132# 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987).

Where the plaintiff is pro se, the

opportunity to amend should be given "at least once when a liberal

3

Thomas also claims that the court should have required him to
provide a more definite statement. A more definite statement
rather than a dismissal is warranted "[w]here the complaint states
a claim in general language but is not sufficiently definite in
certain respects to enable defendant to answer." Liquor Control
Comm'n v. Athas. 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952). Thomas's
complaint here, however, was not sufficiently comprehensible to
withstand a motion to dismiss; therefore a more definite statement
was not appropriate. Id. ("We are of the opinion that both motions
cannot consistently be granted, for it is only when a complaint
states a claim that a motion under Rule 12 (e) can be properly
considered.
If a complaint does not state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, no responsive pleading is required and any
further attack upon the pleading is useless.")
6

reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim
might be stated." Branum, 927 F.2d at 705. See also Eldridcre. 832
F. 2d at 1135-36 (amendment should be allowed "unless it is clear
that they [the deficiencies] cannot be overcome by amendment").
Under the circumstances of this case, however, it was not
an abuse of discretion simply to dismiss the complaint.

The

Attorney General's motion to dismiss gave Thomas notice of the
deficiencies in his pleading.

In response, Thomas chose to stand

on his complaint and did not request any additional time to file an
amended complaint.

R. 54. Nearly two months elapsed between the

time the Attorney General filed the motion to dismiss and the entry
of the order of dismissal.

Under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Thomas could have amended his complaint as a
matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading was
served.

However, he made no attempt to do so.
Moreover, this action was at least the second attempt by

Thomas to state a valid federal civil rights claim based upon the
same operative facts.

This Court may take judicial notice that

Thomas previously sued these same defendants and made essentially
the same allegations against them in Thomas v. Anarerhofer. No. 91C-1283S (D. Utah) (see copy of complaint attached to this Brief as
Addendum G) .

See Utah R. Evid. 201; Moore v. Estelle, 526 F.2d

690, 694 (5th Cir.) (court of appeals may take judicial notice of
prior actions filed by habeas corpus petitioner even though not
made part of the record on appeal), cert, denied. 426 U.S. 953
(1976).

Cf. Duhart v. Carlson. 469 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir. 1972)
7

(district court could take judicial notice of its own records of
prior

class

actions

of

plaintiffs

which

were

dismissed

as

frivolous), cert, denied. 410 U.S. 958 (1973); Rinowood v. Foreign
Auto Works. Inc. . 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah App.) (trial court
properly took judicial notice of proceedings in prior case for
purpose of determining res judicata effect), cert, denied. 795 P.2d
1138 (1990).
As

stated

in the Report

and Recommendation

of the

magistrate in Thomas's prior action:
Plaintiff's complaint arises mainly from
decisions made by the Utah State Board of
Pardons. He complains of not being provided
with an attorney at parole eligibility
hearings. He also complains of allegedly not
being given credit for time served and that
the board of pardons failed to follow
established
rules
and procedures
which
included failing to follow the sentencing
matrix applicable to his crime. The plaintiff
asserts
that
Department
of Corrections
Caseworkers Andrew Hunt and Vickie Bridwell
failed to obtain on his behalf a hearing with
the Board of Pardons and that this violated
his civil rights.
Thomas

v. Anaerhofer.

No. 91-C-1283S

(D. Utah),

Report and

Recommendation dated March 9, 1992 at 3 (attached to this Brief as
Addendum D).

In the federal case, as in this case, Thomas sought

to hold the Utah State Attorney General responsible for the Board
of Pardons' conduct because "VanDam has failed to respond to his
[Thomas's] letters.11 I£. at 5. Compare Thomas's Complaint in this
case ("Plaintiff wrote letters to defendant [Van Dam], notifying
him of credit time served which he ignored and also informed him of

8

misinformation.11 R. 12 (Complaint, 1 23) ). 4
Three months before Thomas filed his complaint in this
case, the federal district court dismissed Thomas's civil rights
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) on the ground that his claims
had no arguable merit.
Utah)•

The

Recommendation

Thomas v. Anaerhofer. No. 91-C-1283S (D.

dismissal

was

based

on

a

thorough

Report

and

(attached as Addendum D) and accompanied by a

detailed written order (attached as Addendum E) . Thus, when Thomas
filed his complaint in this case, the deficiencies in his federal
civil rights claims had been previously explained to him in detail
by the federal district

court.

Those deficiencies were not

corrected in his complaint in this case. The dismissal of Thomas's
federal case was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals in
Thomas v. Anaerhofer, No. 92-4072, slip op. (10th Cir. December 8,
1992), attached as Addendum F to this Brief.5
In any

event,

even

a

liberal

reading

of

Thomas's

4

In the federal case, Thomas omitted R. Paul Van Dam and Peter
Haun from the caption of the complaint, but included them both in
the body of the complaint. In addressing Thomas's allegations in
that case, the federal court considered both Van Dam and Haun named
defendants. See Thomas v. Anaerhofer. No. 91-C-1283S (D. Utah),
Report and Recommendation dated March 9, 1992 at 1 (attached to
this Brief as Addendum D). Thus, the parties in the federal case
were identical to those named in this case, except that in the
federal case Thomas also sued two more defendants (David J.
Angerhofer and Dean Sheffield).
*Under federal law, the res judicata effect of a dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is arguably limited to future
frivolousness determinations in in forma pauperis proceedings. See
Denton v. Hernandez.
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992)
(dictum). It is cited here for the purpose of establishing that
Thomas has been afforded other opportunities to frame cognizable
claims based on the same incidents referred to in his complaint in
this case.
9

complaint gives no reason to believe that there is a valid basis
for a claim against the Attorney General for the violation of
Thomas's federal civil rights; nor has Thomas offered any such
reason in his brief on appeal.
Thomas seems to complain that the Attorney General was in
some way responsible for the alleged failure of the Board of
Pardons to grant Thomas credit for time served in determining his
eligibility for parole and to afford him procedural due process
protections in parole hearings in accordance with the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734
(Utah 1991) (holding due process protections of Utah Constitution
apply to Board of Pardons proceedings).
For at least two reasons, Thomas cannot possibly amend
his complaint to state a cognizable claim against the Attorney
General for the violation of his federal civil rights in a parole
hearing.

First, Thomas has no federal due process protection in

Utah parole proceedings.

Dock v. Latimer. 729 F.2d 1287, 1289-92

(10th Cir.), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 885 (1984); Houtz v. Deland.
718 F. Supp. 1497, 1502 (D. Utah 1989).

This is true despite the

state constitutional procedural protections recognized by the Utah
Supreme Court in Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah
1991) . See Jacobs. Visconsi & Jacobs. Co. v. City of Lawrence. 927
F.2d 1111, 1116-19 (10th Cir. 1991) (state procedural protections
do not create federal due process interests unless they place
substantive limits on discretion of decisionmaker); Campbell v.
Mercer. 926 F.2d 990, 993 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); West Farms
10

Assocs. v. State Traffic Comm'n, 951 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1991)
("the Due Process Clause does not protect against the deprivation
of state procedural rights11), cert, denied.

U.S.

, 112 S.

Ct. 1671 (1992) . Thus, even if the Attorney General had some role
in the conduct of Board of Pardons hearings and the resulting
decisions concerning Thomas's eligibility for parole, Thomas has no
valid federal civil rights claim against either the Board of
Pardons or the Attorney General.
Secondly, to state a valid civil rights claim, Thomas
must allege affirmative conduct creating a causal link between the
named defendant and the alleged constitutional violation.

See

Rizzo v. Goode. 423 U.S. 362, 373-78 (1976) (reversing injunction
against Philadelphia mayor, police commissioner and other city
officials for alleged civil rights violations arising from series
of incidents of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment
citizens by

of

city police officers where defendants played no

affirmative part in depriving members of plaintiff classes of any
constitutional rights, but merely failed to act in the face of a
pattern of violations) . Here, however, the Attorney General has no
authority

or

control

over

the

conduct

of

Board

of

Pardons

proceedings; nor could the Attorney General voluntarily assume such
responsibility.

See Meade v. Grubbs. 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th

Cir. 1988) (dismissing state officials, including attorney general,
from civil rights complaint where "[n]one of these officials has
any statutory authority over the

[allegedly unconstitutional]

conduct of deputy sheriffs" and the plaintiff did not allege that
11

any of them voluntarily assumed such responsibility). Thus# the
necessary causal nexus between the Attorney General and the alleged
violations of Thomas's rights by the Board of Pardons does not
exist.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, this Court should affirm
the judgment of dismissal below.
DATED this

day of April, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

DEBRA J^/MOORE'
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed ;a true and correct cop/ of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid, this
April, 1993 to the following:
Richard Dee Thomas
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
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ADDENDUM A

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 201

ARTICLE H.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information.
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.

28 U.S.C.S. 1915(d) (1989)

§ 1915. Proceedings in forma pauperis
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal,
or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security
therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such
costs or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the
action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress.
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in
writing that it is not taken in good faith.
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit in accordance with subsection (a) of this
section, the court may direct payment by the United States of the expenses
of (1) printing the record on appeal in any civil or criminal case, if such
printing is required by the appellate court; (2) preparing a transcript of
proceedings before a United States magistrate in any civil or criminal case,
if such transcript is required by the district court, in the case of proceedings conducted under section 636(b) of this title or under section 3401(b)
of title 18, United States Code; and (3) printing the record on appeal if
such printing is required by the appellate court, in the case of proceedings
conducted pursuant to section 636(c) of this title. Such expenses shall be
paid when authorized by the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.
(c) The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform
all duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the
same remedies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases.
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable
to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is
untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
(e) Judgment may be rendered for costs at the conclusion of the suit or
action as in other cases, but the United States shall not be liable for any of
the costs thus incurred. If the United States has paid the cost of a
stenographic transcript or printed record for the prevailing party, the same
shall be taxed in favor of the United States.
(June 25, 1948, ch 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 954; May 24, 1949, ch 139, § 98, 63
Stat. 104; Oct. 31, 1951, ch 655, § 51 (b), (c), 65 Stat. 727; Sept. 21, 1959,
P. L. 86-320, 73 Stat. 590; Oct 10, 1979, P. L. 96-82, § 6, 93 Stat. 645.)

42 U.S.C.S. 1981 (1986) (AMENDED NOV. 2 1 , 1992)

§ 1981. Equal rights under the law
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(R. S. § 1977.)
(AMENDED NOV. 21, 1992)

42 U.S.C.S. 1983 (1986)

§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
(R. S. § 1979; Dec. 29, 1979, P. L. 96-170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284.)

42 U.S.C.S. 1985(3) (1989)

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges. If two or more persons in any
State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or for the
purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State
or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons
conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is
lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal
manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person
as an elector for President or Vice-President, or as a member of Congress
of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on
account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party
so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages,
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
(R. S. § 1980.)

42 U.S.C.S. 1986 (1989)

§ 1986. Action for neglect to prevent conspiracy
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to
be done, and mentioned in the preceding section [42 USCS § 1985], are
about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing
the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful
act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal
representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such
person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages
may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons
guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in
the action, and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful
act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such
action therefor, and may recover not exceeding five thousand dollars
damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be
one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the
deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be
sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of
action has accrued.
(R. S. § 1981.)

ADDENDUM B

X
^^

AftogbA. Ana*

W

JUL 3 0 to^

JTfift Of l/TM '

A

/r7~dAjWl/A?:i-We#£LZ£F

JUDCsJ.DS^SFF.ri^ICK
C.o/M&.73iy&!

> -//A/7 S)/ls/

\A nfj/9

/MS, fffij^-m/*'

'

^Jg. 4J& Atttf/trtS^ )SJjkfil/y'rfd>&/»/J9i 3*> ALJZ/P3/KA.C. 6A /&>.

/6. rfffl&f

464,

_. _ ,

„

_,,.

vms do/dc df^rm JLM/r> -fatAt* /s 4/Pk#Jisfo m~ ytiH

ms 4<LHM lf/kfa /MOP p¥$ffl£

JJWM /A4TM- /J /fttrf/W

7%/* rfa

744,

^7ifa#ms<z/o>

^

/?/#w*y<&s7&v/'?&/* /#?£

nil

W**

w>a& £jwi y.Tflh Am

f/faw/i/mdwtiribp

/6y c6V/&u

O//>£>A

/ ^ / ^ ^

ttfik
'Cwrfwfa

'MMfe, til

0/1,
M
— / ) - - , „ ,~, , , ™ .,..,»-*w~j- l A -jLf . --~'~//'r~-'j'j

^^/^S0/^^4/f^^4W^

w AmjwtfMft/s/Stf/Mdtf,Afo4/pk //m sf/i^jpmMc&fa
4/tfwty ^mAm^m/o/f/^,
MJr/4/wfl% fr^/fym**f

W&7/r?44t//q/bf/h

.-".../

--/

Lr.

^

WTCMA/
/*

/4L4//& /fan /ft
M//r)/M/*4&S

A&

7.-&fafss/vrftrt4/p/fe

w/fatffs <sirtd/fo>

V l/vAtfl 7774L efMrfJAf. W?S'//ff/

-, .,

y

Mpw//&/*/SA$c/*/wjm'a0 dfflfc fop fwmt> df/nflti/i
WtMfi-

M'tf TO Mfaf

rffa/ft&Jt
$

&

%

&

-

.

*

•sere//1, /77QF rana r.c/n/77), v&"/:j4 r/j. 9J&-A3(&/C//<,/fg?).

J!/. /kfa/iafi c^/ms dJbm/4 ^MsM^-daMMt-

Mil

Yaps /iofdchi

Jter//m)

***rfjtf*fk&id/ifc) Afatfty44/%

£tf

tftec^lto fa //AA

& /?o/6 /?&///y /rih £M/y& 4^6/^ AW4&- aefa d/?<p/yMQt

^Morm'Afflux/

JM fa 4/^fjx^/lmbh^cifi

-..,
6 *&**... ..r/£?.
- ''& 4,fa* donsfflfflM/m
/& 431 /JS jet ft$&k ToJ^/mW

/^^^^M^.^M/^W

Wert

/fogy) AAZtyoy,

Adit. A/tsmM^Lm^ ssnAsyp. //%YAAt4& /fa).

4 £&%.
-'-'- l~*fifth
ftWMWbJw

4M6rt//f^

44£/»/)/oyuJ

'

tf^/)A/W/firt<rfof£M/uH(^

4sZM$yttV& /o/6#. /ft*//*/). 7S/teA& v/o/rffat$ 7b MM
<r/rf^/W?/<W'4S7i> dfrij/v/vA- Aft

ffbWs /TtosfAifr ww fwpjp-fir .,.*.-.. -—,

/fa

&/ms^JM^

4/&7W tf

Trr-,

w-~

I,#/J4MJ^/AflM^
/SMMJ

001

_ /OTAST 61/iTM^

/bw/o/t

/OWTA

4W fflf/

7& Jfc w/7
/3

00.14

#4*14fte //) 4/1 4/nww-/t> M amftf/w* 4T T/M'Av/tw -fa ^

^£6 ON A dUJM

//? 4/1 4/nwd' TO fa /fcfo/n//*tf 4r7/M

( fall Mdf/WMfton)

on 5

4fa)f&
Jm~ gptoid 4& ft fa fi> jJw&m,
4A& SMWfpJf It/MoW/M

4M//%lfi/.

tf&MpWtffif) rfo /tyM if

Witt,

rfm-fty- & firm TO 4A f w drjwrt'rM- 4 r f / > 4/i 4/rtw
lrvjbAi/jAfrfo/wr)

/%J&W Syl/1 4W4ff& ffart A-rmft

4ft//Vfi

ittyffo &- do/Vrt/md WWrtty

M-./tMP" ft/)ft4"r orwf

&/mwdim
(MoM<yx/&s)

ffyt* 4j9/*sr rM- 4m<m*
'&4S

./tfty^ ,/td9Mlf//I

Ms

1

/* /f f/? 0/dsAt /ffwyfe w 4^/ffay/$//&*,,
<&u-mWs (/&m w*w *• Sw/4/tr 4md^mf:
rt
mrptf% l/6dtyte/?/ffa /ft*; /9\

3. /C* 4n / W W ' ^fmtofay'tfrrtpf* trf/i <&>/#<

l

/)/<?&//> /r//j

/<&j/}<u,77b>? W/tf Ms Aim*:

/&/- 4fa/ 4/p/bjpMik 4mr $& ^ / M ^ i W $

M> jtmxsmte-fa

/>&//?///?'Ms

/?o/; &W4</67&7 4//j /Wrt/M/rt/?V«.

Co/v/>/?//?/;

<f/.ffi/ti6j^fad/tf/tyxk
/7i& <?4& £orf/>74/W4 fir//? £M7-Sc/tf fo /?0 4>/4/f
/)£d£/?faTjroN /MMfiENALTVfiF/>£Art/M

faJdoMjc/.

/1M&C.

/%

/t4Zd.

&<*. /UJ.

^

/iFArrfTdMZ

OF M#TLZA//>r

f/.7$
3U>£&fi

frowsy m^B

Mftmfon
PAUIW.BOYDEN
VICTORIA J. PALACOS
GARY L WEBSTER

THE STAT! OF UTAH

PAUL W. SHEFFIELD.
Administrator

BOARD OF PARDONS
6065 South 300 East
Sift UK* City. Utah 64107

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Coneideretion of the Status of.

HlfWAET) DEE THOMAS

OBSOSNa 99913260
., Utah State Priaon No. 13260

The above-entitled matter cam* onfora hearing before tha Utah Slala Board of Pardons on tha.
198 8 for consideration as:

19TH day of.

DECEMBER

1. •

ORIGNALHEARNG
5. I SPECIAL ATTENTION OF THE BOARD
R£>EARNG
6. PfESCtSSION
REDETERMINATION
7.
TERMINATION OF SENTENCE AND PAROLE
Aftar tha sletement of
.and tha following witnesses)
1L
2)_
and good cause appearing, tha Board mada tha following decision:.

Z •M
3.
4

EJ Rescind
•
•

MAY 2 3 ,

1989

parole data. CONTINUE PENDING RECEIPT Or ADDITION

^19_

'

Parole to baeoma effective
Amand parole agreement to add tha following special conditions:
1.
2..
3..
4.
_, 19

Q Rehearing tor.

_, 19

INFORMATION

with tha foflowing spaoial conditbns:

for tha following reasons:

Q Termination of sentence and parole to become effective.
•

Expiration of sentence

,19.
., 19

.

REMARKS:

Cnme

Struct,

Cage No,

Judge

Expit.Dale

PALMER
LIFE
5-LIFE 2-33*0
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
1.
PALMER
LIFE
AGGRAVATED
KIDNAPPING
5-LIFE
2-3340
*•—..
3.
0 - 5 CS CR80-6S2 LEARY
ATTFMTPFn ESCAPE
UU
4._
_ _
5
6.
.
7.
It is further ordered thai in tha event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of rules and regulations of the Utah State
Prison, any community oorredbns center or other residential facility, or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned or is found
in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of this decision, the order may be made null and void.
DECEMBER 19
By order of the Board of Pardons of the Stale of Utah, I have this data
signature as Administrator for and on behaf of the Slate of Utah, Board of Pardons.

198 8 affixed my

W., Sheffield.
Administrate
Paul W.
Sheffield, Administrator
Art appTcation tor redetermination may be made after one year from the Boa/fa
prevbus action. Appfcations may be obtained through a case worker.

twz\

MEMBERS
OENNIS M FUCHS
VICTORIA J RALACIOS
GARY L. WEBSTER

l°V5S^F &
^T^ZZ^y
'

PAUL w

SHEFFIELD
Administrator

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ORDER OF PAROLE
IN TOE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF RICHARD DEE THOMAS
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. H O T
This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or expiration of sentence
havinfi come before the Utah State Board of Pardons in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 9th
day of September. 1987, and the applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the
right to appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order:
It is hereby ordered that Richard Dee Thomas be paroled from the punishment and sentence
heretofore imposed upon him/her by a iudge of the Second and Third Judicial District Court in
and for the County of Davis and Salt Lake for the crime(s) of Aggravated Robbery, 1st degree,
Expiration Life tops; Aggravated Kidnapping, 1st degree Consecutive, Expiration Life tops;
Attempted Escape. 3rd degree Consecutive, Expiration Life tops.
The parole shall not become effective until the 12th day of July, 1988. The applicant
agrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by signing the parole
agreement.

The parole agreement or contract shall be administered bv duly authorized agents

of the Utah State Department of Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons.
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant shall be guilty
of anv infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison or shall fail or
refuse to perform duties as assigned bv the Utah State Prison or is found to be in violation
of anv other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this
Order of Parole is revoked and becomes null and void.
Dated this 9th day of September, 1987.
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 15th dav of September,
1987, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and hereby affix mv signature as
Administrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff.

-

vs.
QJKLSZ

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Qg^~TUow\rt A

I

Case No. .

V

Honorable

Defendant

Date

p^<A/»^l

n . ITM/rOS*

MoWPAAAtorA

Ifi ,!<«?>&

O The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and.
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason wbf sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted byJD a jury; Q the court; CXfrfea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of
A^rC*"* p l f n
Q» * ^ i m i H V r v i
t felony
of the aiSQs: degree, Da class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by Q i *$ov\
and the State being represented h y ^i»^\<»\naJ$ {$ now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
O to^a maximum mandatory term of _ _ _ years and which may be for life;
CVnot to exceed five years;
O of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
O of not less than five years and which may be for life;
O not to exceed
years;
O and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
O and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to
o i u c h sentence Is to run concurrently with p , ^
"^MftVCfiLr tftUwT.
$l\U?c)
O such sentence is to run consecutively with
O upon motion of O State, D Defense. D Court. Countfs)r
.
are hereby dismissed. %

r%/Cl«l£A*A«.KK\r ih (r^ fgr^v/g. rx*eA±k WA K V U ^ &>j\\)es) &i*X^ nr4it»UQ
O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (O prison) sentence and placed on probation In the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
^
pursuant to the attached condpibns of probation.
[1/Oefendant Is remanded into thecustooy pi the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Oie^delivery to the Utah State
Prison. Draper!" Utah. prD for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
yfdjmprjsoned In accordance wliMhis Judgment and Commitment."
cycommitment s h a l f I s w l r l z ^
X*r*r*<
DATED this

^day

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney

0023

Page
aoe

-L of.

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 EAST FIFTH SOUTH, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111
532-5444
Felony—Misdemeanor Divisions
F.JOHN HILL
Otctof

BOARD OF TRUSTEES
ROBERT VAN SCP/ER
Channan

0 . GILBERT ATHAY
iaOOieo

UONEL FRANKEL
JIMI MITSUNAGA
IRENE NIELSEN
RAY GROUSSMAN
STEWART HANSON. Jr.
LON HINDE
JOHN O'CONNELL
JOSEPH A. GETER
JOSEPH G. CHENEY. Jr.

March 8, 1989
Board of Pardons
6100 South 300 East
2nd Ploor
Murray, Utah 84107
Re:

State v. Richard P. Thomas
Case No. CR88-1063

Dear Board Members:
I represented Richard D. Thomas on the conviction for
attempted distribution of a controlled substance on November 18,
1989. I believe it is Important for the Board to realize that Mr.
Thomas was instrumental in the government's ability to obtain
convictions on a matter in federal court where pleas were entered as
a result of Mr. Thomas's availability and willingness to testify as
a prosecution witness. As a result of that willingness Mr. Thomas's
present incarceration is no doubt more difficult.
In addition, this charge was filed six months after it
occurred and Mr. Thomas was not arraigned in Circuit Court to begin
the prosecution until fourteen months after the crime occurred.
Therefore, he served time in prison for a parole violation for the
same behavior (ie his reinvolvement with drugs.) For all of these
reasons Mr. Verhoef in the County Attorney's office agreed to
recommend that Mr. Thomas's sentence here run concurrent with his
prior case, and that he still be released to a halfway house in May
of 1989 as was planned before this conviction. The court in
agreement with this, sentenced Mr. Thomas concurrently and

002,4

page two
letter to the Board of Pardons
Re: Richard D. Thomas
March 8, 1989

recommended he receive credit for time served since he returned to
prison for a parole violation, to hopefully allow him to keep his
release date and attempt to make amends for the delay in prosecuting
Mr. Thomas.
2 hope you will consider these matters in determining an
equitable release date.
Si
DEBRA K. LOY
Attorney at Law

^

DKL/js

00?5

State of Utah

BOARD OF PARDONS
Norman H. Bangtrter
Governor

H.L(Pete)Haun

446 East 6400 South. MM 300
Murray, Utah 64107
(K1) 261-6*64

October 10,1990

Chairman
Donald E. Bianchard
Michael R.Sibbett
William L Patera

Richard Thomas, USP# 13260
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Dear Mr. Thomas:
This is to notify you that you are scheduled for a Rescission Hearing before the
Utah State Board of Pardons on October 18,1990, at 11:00 a.m. at the Utah State
Prison. Our records note new conviction. That subject will be the topic of your hearing.

Sincerely,
H.L. HAUN, CHAIRMAN/ADMINISTRATOR
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS

^tk. 6?< 4n-f
/C^
STA
Wt
Enid O. Pino
Hearing Officer

cc: Utah Stale Prison
File

4136c

QOZb

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
inrsaiii

DECISION

Consideration of the Status of THOMAS, RICHARD

USP No.13260

The above-entitled natter came before the Board of Par-ions on the
October , 1990 for consideration as:
1.
2.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS
~ CLASS A

After hearing the etateaeat of

3. XXX RESCISSION
4,
OTHER
fl.y/,_/

jt/i

an 5 the follogins

TL,.^^

vitness(es) 1)
tue following decision vas rendered:
R-*vo!:a _ _

15th day of

2)

parole date,

Rescind

_S.JJJL/^

1 / ^ P a r o l a t o be c o n 2 e f f e c t i v e
conditTbns:

parole date,
<>,

f

2 2 . t<*oiE

» wltli the f o l l o ^ i n r . s p e c i a l

•

A.tend p a r o l e a j r e c ^ e n t t o a d d / d e l e t e t h e f o l l o w i n g s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s :

iSJ*--—£/*.

D>
/ P

Su Ly f „ ^ ,

iLLJL-i.

C L/C' f*« 6 /

F.
^leltearicg

*or

Terralnat 5 on of Sentence to become effective^
Expiration of Sentence
Other
NOTE: This Interim Decision is binding and in full force and effect until
reviewed by the Board of Pardons members, who will make the final
determination in tcic natter* In the event the above named shall be founl
guilty of any infraction of the Rules and Regulations of the Utah State
Prison, of any Conaunlty Correction Center or of any residential facility or
is found in violation of any lav of the State of Utah or other good cause,
this order /nay ba mac's null and void.
October 18, 1990
Date

3.L.

HiUM, C h f i i r n n

0027

0
(M
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH CTATE T.SCIS !'0. ?f)ri 3 2 30
Consideration of the Status of THOMAS, RICHARD USE

PRISON NO. 13260

T'.r abovo-encitl?cl itattor ca-ne on for a hearing before the Utah Stat? Bc?r3 oJ
Fardons on the 30th day of October, 1990, for consideration as:
RESCISSION' -JEERING
and the following uitneg"?cs:

A'tir the statement of

2)

1)

a:.1 »->a-l cius;- <ij)i>?j.r!.n», tie BD.irf tin^a the f o l l c i n g

^*c'ston 5 j ' or jp.r:

ORDER
x*:<

•'•.£?5.-,' o^/*»».'3

X'!X

Parol" to becoae effective 09/22/1902

r>aro!e lats,
with following special coiliti O J S

LisT> ' -> i - o 1-- s T i s i a n : tf> -•"!! t'r..s following, st>»c*e1 coa!it 4 on«:
I. COMPLETE ISP PROGRAM,
_
4. SUBSTANCE ABUSZ THERAPY.
X:

A

k

*rsi^r;s.

••-.-";\j

^ * *. •

c.

' v»

Re.iearins for
T,,

..12lL n , l

"* «

-^nt^nca in*! circle *.o be cone effective

ZLxpiratiou of sentence effective
0: i2r

1
2
3
4

=11 12
/.3 3R',VAT~ : ) ""'>'»B7..;Y
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING
~">?,\?2 r.OM r j 3 7 0 r - 7
DISTRIBUTING DRUGS FOR VALUE

» "»• M •"

^ A C

1

5 ?-i340
5 2-3340
5 C.-S0-5P2
5 831910631

J'JD?E
PALVER**LIFE
PALMER**LIFE
L?/RV
UOFFAT

' ? I " " T I •>!,•

11/21/1993

Ti*3 ••'.acisioi is =u v ject t? review ar.d Tio^f.ficatlon by tho r>oard of Far'onr, it
any tine until actual release from custody.
Bv ordar of the *?ar^ oT Psrlons of the, 3ta"t>xo ° Utah, I have this ?ste
30th day of October, 1990, affixed ny signature as Chairman fcr and
o: behalf r»jr to-? St.'te 3* Vtsh, Tear** of ^trdons.
H. L. HAUiJ, Chaircan

0C?S

State of Utah
BOARD OF PARDONS
Norman EL Bangerter
Governor

HX. (Pete) Haun
Chairman
Donald E. Blanchard
Michael R. Sibbett
William L. Peters
Heather N.Cooke
Members

448 East 6400 South - Suite 300
Murray. Utah 84107
(801)261-6464

February 7, 1991
Richard Thomas USP01326O
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Dear Mr. Thomas:
This letter is in response to a letter received by the Board of Pardons on
February 1, 1991. This letter was addressed to Heather Cook, a Board member.
Part of my job as a Hearing Officer is to respond to this correspondence.
Your first concern is the fact that you are housed in maximum security on a
safety override. This is basically protection. You asked the Board to do
something about your status at the prison. There is nothing that can be done
by the Board of Pardons. We do not have jurisdiction over the operation of
the Utah State Prison or any of its custody decisions. They have a
classification system which, as I understand it, has administrative
overrides. Apparently because of your informant activities in the past, you
have been deemed as needing protection. In any case those questions relative
to your classification will need to be addressed to the Department of
Corrections.
The second question, if I read your letter correctly, is that you would like
to appear in front of the Board of Pardons to evaluate why you cannot return
to the community as prescribed. The Board of Pardons had a Rescission hearing
in October of 1990. They made the decision to rescind your May 26, 1992
parole date and grant you a new parole date of September 22, 1992. That's
after an additional four months. The Board has dealt with your case and the
only mechanism available would be the re-determination process.
To be quite honest with you, Mr. Thomas, given the fact that you are currently
under the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons for Aggravated Robbery, First
Degree Aggravated Kidnapping, a First Degree Escape from Custody, and Third
Degree in distributing drugs for value, it is felt that you probably do not
deserve any special consideration at this point in time.
Sincerely,
v^cua S t ^ K
PAUL LARSEN
Senior Hearing Officer

ja

or?s

D O I

M I
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THIRD CIRCUIT COUK, - SLC
Defendant

Page
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APRIL 22, 1991
10:16 AM
SLP Case: 901001432 FS
MONDAY

Citation:

State Felony
Judge: Philip K. Palmer

THOMAS, RICHARD DEE

NO CDR | FOR THIS CASE
Charges
Violation Date: 07/16/88
1. THEFT BY DECEPTION
Plea:
2. THEFT BY DECEPTION
Plea: Guilty

76-6-405.3
Finding/Judgment: Amended
76-6-405.A
Finding/Judgment: Guilty Plea

Proceedings
01/31/90 Case filed on 01/31/90.
l
02/01/90 ARR
scheduled for 2/ 2/90 at
02/02/90 Fel Arr
Judge Robin W. Reese
TAPE: 248
COUNT: 469
Deft present w/o counsel
ATD None Present
ATP BUD ELLETT
PRE DSP
scheduled for 02/08/90 at 0200 P in room ? with PKP
LDA Appointed
02/05/90 FILED APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL
LDA: FRANCES M PALACIOS
FILED FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
02/08/90 PALMER/PB
T 270
DEFT PRESENT W/COUNSEL FRANCES PALACIOS
MARTY VERHOEF PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
ON MOTION OF THE STATE
C/O CHARGE AMENDED TO CLASS A THEFT BY DECEPTION
DEFT ADVISED AND WAIVED RIGHTS TO A TRIAL
DEFT PLEAD GUILTY TO AMENDED CHARGE
DEFT WAIVED TIME FOR SENT
SENT:
1 YR JAIL AT UTAH STATE PRISON CONCURRENT
COMMITMENT SENT TO JAIL
Entered case disposition of: CLOSED
Accounting Summary
Citation Amount:

3000.00

Additional Case Data
Sentence Summary
1. 76-6-405.3
Fine amount:
Jail:
Community Service:
2. 76-6-405.A
Fine amount:
Jail: 365
DA
Community Service:

Plea:
Suspended:
Suspended:
00

Find: Amended
.00

Plea: Guilty
Fir
Suspended:
.00
Suspended: 365 DA

ea

Pf30

CAC
LKC
SSJ
SSJ
SSJ
SSJ
SSJ
SSJ
LMG
LMG
PKB
PKB
PKB
PKB
PKB
PKB
PKB
PKB
PKB
GAR
GAR

D O C K E T
THIRD CIRCUIT COUKx - SLC
Citation:
Defendant
THOMAS, RICHARD DEE
Case Disposition
Disposition..

Page
22, 1991
10:16 AM
SLP Case: 901001432 FS
State Felony
MONDAY

DATE: 02/08/90

CLOSED

Personal Description
Sex: M
DOB: 03/09/54
Dr. Lie. No.:
Scheduled Hearing Summary
ARRAIGNMENT
PRELIM CALENDAR CALL

State: UT

Expires:

on 02/02/90
on 02/08/90

0200 P in room 1 with RWR
0200 P in room ? with PKP

the docket report for this case.
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INMATE GRIEVANCE FORM

^

GF

-l

THIS FORM REQUIRES THAT BOTH INMATES AND DESIGNATED STAFF (ASSIGNED)i jSOCIAL
J U U . I i SERVICES
- O ^ v ^ t i ^ A 3~Tfct \
WORKERS / CASE WORKERS, ETRNIC MINORITY RESOURCE SPECI.ALISTS (EMRS), CAPTAINS OR
° 1 "CD^ v
LIE LTENANTS) THOROUGHLY COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING

>fcy?ft*>

INMATES NAM!

USP#

SpccQc nature of grievance (Who, What, When, Where and H o y ? : / ^

£*fo

HOUSLNG AREA

22
^&\bo^

n'^^W^^£^^SA^'SH^'/'<:l

^ / ^ - /

Identify those contacted regarding your grievance and state what YOU HAVE DONE to resolve the issue.

/?P V.
)X/As^

/_

?A&~ gg^feV^.^LJf

7^7

What is ihe specific remedy you seek?

S

/fC

/</- Ax
INMATE'S SIGNATURE / DATE

0C32

OCT 0 2 199!
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INMATE GRIEVA N( R FORM
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THIS FORM REQUIRES THAT BOTH INMATES AND DESIGNATED STAFF (ASSIGNED) SOCIAL SERVICES IO-t3-Cl
WORKERS / CASE WORKERS, ETHNIC MINORITY RESOURCE SPECIALISTS (EMRS), CAPTAINS OR
LIEUTENANTS) THOROUGHLY
THOR'
COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:
AA-lA?

fa- //?&*&

INMATES NAME ,

USP# / - IS^OU

HOUSING AREA .

SECTION 1 - INFORMAL A C T I O N TohccnmnleiftrthvTnmat,
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Idcniify those contacted regarding your grievance and state what YOU HAVE DONE to resolve the issue.

/t-rttUJ r/rtt<. ?«.&./».
^ / L 7 ^ b .^^^Z^"^/f^^^u/^ae^Ato^

What is ihcspecific remedy you s<#k?
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/fl$/~L.
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SIGNATUREifi

LEVEL 1 6RIEVANCE
STAFF RESPONSE
UTAH STATE PRISON
6R1EVANCE NUMBER:.

9 ID 10.0664

INMATE NAME:

RICHARD THOMAS

INMATE NUMBER:_

USP 13260

1 sooke to Mr Paul Larsen today. He states that the Board of Pardons
was In the process of preparing Information for a request of discovery
requested by uour attorney. David Anoerhofer. made bu a letter from
him sent in August. While In that process theu received uour letter
that you eledge has not been responded to. Mr Larsen said theu had to
complete the process of completing the request for dlscoveru before
they could begin to process uour request.
Never the less. Mr. Lersen did address two Issues brought UP In your
letter.
1. He will forward your request for redetermination to the board.
Vou will have your answer as to whether the board will honor your
reouest within two weeks from the date of this writing.
2. if uou wish to have credit for time served from Judge Moffatfs
court you or your attorney must provide proof of time served to the
board.

If there ere any more issues 1n your letter Mr. Larsen will address them
es soon es his time permits.

LIEUTENANT E.R.TAL8QT/ October 30,1991

Supreme Ctfurt
^ieri* of ptialj

gRtrtprrtr ©. JCnfa*
A**«uri* ©jit! 3««tut

332^ateC«]rii0l
Ckrk

3u»tirt
CJfrt«tra* | R . Purfymt

<fcdi fladu Cits, |ltaJf B4114
October

Murium JR. JHall

^Ridpul | l . Zintmtnwm
Jmitr*

, 1991

Mr. Richard Dee Thomas
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Dear Mr. Thomas:
Please find enclosed a copy of the Foote u. Board
of Pardons opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. The official
citation to this case is 808 PACIFIC 2nd 734. It is a valid
Utah Supreme Court opinion.
The Executive Director of the juc|iCiai conduct
Commission for the state of Utah is Dean W. Sheffield. His
office address is 180 South 300 West, Suite 224, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101.
I disagree with your conclusion that the Chief
Justice of the Utah Supreme Court is "
in charge of the
proceedings
of the Judicial Conduct Commission.91 Nothing
could be further from the truth. The Judicial Conduct Commission
is appointed pursuant to statute (passed by the legislature)
and the Supreme Court shall review the commission's proceedings.
(See photo copy of the latter half of Article VIII Section 13
of the Utah State Constitution)
You requested a response to your filings with the
Judicial Conduct Commission. I regret to say I have control
over the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court only. I can't
tell the Judicial Conduct Commission how to inn its office.
The Utah Supreme Court may review the results of the
Judicial Conduct Commission, but the clerk of the Supreme Court
cannot tell the commission how to do its business.
Very t r u l y you^s,
f

^ULl

GeoffAl/
Clerk
Enc:

J •' Bu'tler
- -j

F 71

«f<^5

LEVEL 11 RESPONSE

Reference No:
Subject C o d e : ~ ~
Location Code:
Month, Day, Year:

91D-10-0664
62
03
ll-ZZ-91

Mi, Richard Dee Thomas:
I have reviewed your grievance. You allege that Pete Haun
Paul Larsen of the Board of Pardons are not responding to your
legitimate questions regarding your term of incarceration. You
request that Paul Larsen or Pete Haun respond in writing to your
questions.
The Department of Cox x i rtions has no authority over the Board c f
Pardons or its employees, II cannot order either Mr. Larsen or Mr,
Haun to respond to your questions. Lt. Talbot has, in good faith,
contacted Mr. Larsen regarding your situation, and his Level 1
response is self-explanatory.
Iii : in i i g i i e i ai n :: s ii s :::i E n i c 'd.

• .

I suggest that if you wish to appeal my disposition you may r?r
so by following appropriate policy and procedure FDr. 02/03.02
Appeals Process.

Billie Casper
Grievance Coordinator
C. KIM THOMPSON, DIRECTOR
INSTITUTIONAL 0£££ATI0NS

£• 'fe*vr^ky-—f/y^—
C.Aim Thompson V
BC/cj
0745/96

36

State of Utah
BOARD OF PARDONS
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

ILL. (Pete) Haun

448 East 6400 South • Suite 300
Murray. Utah 84107
(801)261-6464

Chairman

Donald E. Bianchard
Michael R.Sibbett
William L. Peters
Heather N. Cooke
Member*

Decembei

1991

Mr. Richard Thomas, USP# 13260
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Dear Hi: > ^ "Thomas:
This letter is in response to your letter received in November, 1991* The
Board of Pardons reviewed your letter and made a decision of no change.
Specifically, the Board asked me to relate to you that you were given
consideration by the Board of Pardons for your activities described by your
attorney, Debra Loy.
Sincerely,

PAUL LARSEN
SENIOR HEARING OFFICER
ja

flf37

gtate of Utah
Judicial Conduct Commission
Westgate Business Center, Suite 224
180 South 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Phone (801) 521-3911

1

Mr. Richard D. Thomas
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

I

:

The Judicial Conduct Commission has dismissed your complaint
against Judge James Sawaya.
Your remedy is appelldL v . <nnl In m i nnl w i I li i n I In
the -Commission.

mi

IMIK

I mn n I

1
nrss

ADDENDUM C

Third Judicial District

OCT 2 8 1992
By.

PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
KIRK M. TORGENSEN (4927)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)-265-5638

CV

<E COUfllY

mi To^rk
Deputy Oferk

\ )

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 01- UTAH
Case No. 920904193

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Judge Dennis I Frederick

* ,r
Defendants.

This matter having come before the court on Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, and the court having reviewed the pleadings;
S ORDERED, that Plaintiff
dismissed with prejudice for failure
relief

granted

and

the

Defendants' Memorandum ii i Support

Dated this

Rights Complaint ,s
state a claim for which

other

reasons

set

forth in

I: their Motion to Dismiss,

^ r < day of October, 199
FREDERICK

0PR3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
iereby cer tify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Order of Dismissal was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Richard Dee Thomas
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

M

Dated this / / ' T day of October, 1992.

ffilCt/h

e \4UjL4trfl4*4

orB4

ADDENDUM D

FILED IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT.
MURT. DISTRICT OF U T A H / ^

MARrj^E
MARKUS BUMMER. CLERK
IK THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE iSIsTRICTKOF <UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
t

Plaintifff

Case No.

91-C-1283 S

t

vs.
DAVID J. ANGERHOFER, et. al.#

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
:

Defendants.

The plaintiff, Richard Dee Thomas, an inmate at the Utah
State Prison, has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against David
J. Angerhofer, Utah State Prison contract attorney.

He has also

named as defendants? Andrew Hunt and Vickie Bridwell, Department
of Corrections Caseworkers; Paul Larsen, Enid O. Pino, Board of
Pardons Hearing Officers; Peter Haun, Board of Pardons Chairman;
Paul Sheffield, Board of Pardons Administrator; Michael Sibbett,
Victoria Palacios, Donald Blanchard, Paul Boyden, Heather Cooke,
Utah Board of Pardons; Dean Sheffield, Judicial Conduct
Commission Director; Judge James Sawaya, Third Judicial District
Court of Utah and R. Paul VanDam, Utah State Attorney General.
The plaintiff states that he has been denied due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The

plaintiff seeks $ 3,000,000 in compensatory damages.
The case has been referred to the magistrate judge under 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B). The issue is whether service of process
should be allowed or the case dismissed, in whole or in part,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

This report and recommendation has

been submitted pursuant to the reference.
It is unclear from plaintifffs complaint if he is intending
to name as defendants the State of Utah, the Board of Pardons,
the Department of Corrections, the State Judicial Conduct
Commission and the Utah State Attorney General, or if his intent
is to name the individuals members of these entities. To the
extent that plaintiff is attempting to sue the state or its
entities, his suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit

by plaintiff in federal court against the State of Utah or its
entities without its consent.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

663 (1974) ; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Craifflnggjpnr 327
U.S. 573, 579 (1946).

Consent to suit in federal court has not

been given in this case.

See Richins v. Industrial Construction,

Inc., 502 F.2d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir. 1974).

Furthermore, the

State of Utah and its entities are not persons under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, and may not be sued under § 1983.

See Will v. Michigan

Dept. of State Police. 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989).

The

plaintiff's complaint against the State of Utah, the Board of
Pardons, the Department of Corrections and other state entities
must be dismissed.
The plaintiff claims that Utah State Prison contract
attorney David Angerhofer has failed to provide him with adequate

2

legal assistance at the state prison.

Defendant Angerhofer as a

contract attorney for the Utah State Prison does not act tinder
color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Polk
County v. Dobson. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).

As to defendant David

Angerhofer plaintiff's complaint should therefore be dismissed.
Plaintiff's complaint arises mainly from decisions made by
the Utah State Board of Pardons. He complains of not being
provided with an attorney at parole eligibility hearings. He
also complains of allegedly not being given credit for time
served and that the board of pardons failed to follow established
rules and procedures which included failing to follow the
sentencing matrix applicable to his crime. The plaintiff asserts
that Department of Corrections Caseworkers Andrew Hunt and Vickie
Bridwell failed to obtain on his behalf a hearing with the Board
of Pardons and that this violated his civil rights. There is no
constitutional right to a parole eligibility hearing.

See

Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex. 442 U.S. 1, (1979); Dock v. Latimer, 729 F.2d 1287 (10th
Cir. 1984).
Pardons.

Such a decision is in the discretion of the Board of

The Department of Corrections and the Board of Pardons

are separate entities. The Department of Corrections has no
control over the Board of Pardons and cannot force them to
provide plaintiff with a parole eligibility hearing.

Plaintiff's

complaint against Department of Corrections caseworkers should
therefore be dismissed.
As to members of the Utah Board of Pardons, the Chairman and

3

the Director, all are absolutely immune from damage liability for
actions taken in performance of their official duties regarding
the granting or denying of parole.1

Knoll v. Webster. 838 F.2d

450, 451 (10th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff's complaint against all
Board of Pardon members should therefore be dismissed.
Plaintiff's complaint should also be dismissed as to Dean
Sheffield, Director of the Judicial Conduct Commission.
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Sheffield failed to act on his
complaint against the Justices of the Utah Supreme Court.

Such a

complaint is not related to plaintiff's civil rights claim as
there is an insufficient nexus between the complaint and
defendant Dean Sheffield.

Rizzo v. Goode. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

Furthermore, the Judicial Conduct Commission does not have
jurisdiction over the Utah Supreme Court and cannot order them to
grant plaintiff's state habeas corpus petition.

Plaintiff has no

federal constitutional right to have his complaint to the
Judicial Conduct Commission act on by anyone.

See Linda R«S. v.

Richard P. and Texas. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
As to Third Judicial District Judge James Sawaya the
plaintiff cannot maintain suit against him for damages under 42
1

Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled under the federal
constitution to be represented by an attorney at parole hearings.
His assertion is incorrect. The Foote decision specifically states
that any right to be represented by counsel at parole hearings and
review of parole hearings by state judges comes from the Utah State
Constitution and not the Federal Constitution. Foote v. Utah Board
of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Ut. 1991). Further, the United States
Supreme Court has made it clear that there is no right to counsel
at such hearings. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional ComplexP 442 U.S. 1; Baxter v. Palmicriano. 425 U.S.
308 (1976).

4

U.S.C. § 1983 for things done in his judicial capacity.

Judge

Sawaya is entitled to absolute immunity for his judicial
activities.

Stump v. Soarkman. 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978).

The

judge is entitled to immunity even if he acted maliciously or in
excess of his authority.

Schepp v. Fremont County, Wvo.. 900

F.2d 1448, 1451 (10th Cir. 1990); Myers v. Garff. 876 F.2d 79# 80
(10th Cir. 1989).

The plaintiffs complaint against Judge Sawaya

is improper and must be dismissed.
The plaintiff also complains that Utah Attorney General Paul
VanDam has failed to respond to his letters. This claim is
frivolous and does not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.

The plaintifffs complaint against the Utah Attorney

General should be dismissed.
Because the plaintiff has not presented an arguable claim
against any of the defendants his complaint should be dismissed
as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). ffeitzke v, Williams. 490
U.S. 319 (1989).
Cir. 1990).

Revnoldson v. Shillincrer, 907 F.2d 124 (10th

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Copies of the foregoing report and recommendation are being
mailed to the parties. They are hereby notified of their right
to file objections hereto within ten days from the receipt
hereof.
DATED this

*

day of March, 1992.

Rondld N. Boyce
United States Magistrate Judge
5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I have mailed a copy of the foregoing
Report and Recommendation to
Richard Dee Thomas
P O Box 250
Draper UT 84020
this

c\^k
V

, day of March, 1992.

^•-^••»
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ADDENDUM E

trfi-t ,

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRXCT OF__UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 91-C-1283-S

vs.
DAVID J. ANGERHOFER, et al.,

O R D E R

Defendant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Richard Dee
Thomas'

(1) Objection

Recommendation

(R&R)

to the magistrate
recommending

judge's Report

dismissal

of

Mr.

and

Thomas'

complaint, and (2) Motion Requesting Reconsideration for Appointment of Counsel. Mr. Thomas has requested a hearing in connection
with these motions. However, because Mr. Thomas' request does not
satisfy the good cause standard set forth in D. Ut. 202(d) and the
Court concludes a hearing is not necessary, Mr. Thomas' request for
a hearing is denied.

The Court has reviewed Mr. Thomas' objection, the R&R and the
complaint under the applicable de novo standard, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).

0/
)

Plaintiff

complains

that

Mr.

Angerhofer,

attorney, acted under color of state lav.

the

contract

The magistrate judge

pointed out that a contract attorney does not act under color of
state law. Polk County v. Dobson. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).

Plaintiff

correctly asserts that when that contract attorney conspires with
an official he may be considered as having acted under color of
law.

Tower v. Glover. 467 U.S. 914 (1984).

However, in order to

gain the benefit of that exception, Mr. Thomas must plead a
conspiracy by alleging

"specific facts showing agreement and

concerted action among defendants".
543, 545 (10th Cir. 1989).
Mr.

Durre v. Dempsey, 869 F.2d

Upon review the Court concludes that

Thomas has failed to adequately plead

a conspiracy and

therefore, Mr. Angerhofer must be dismissed as not having acted
under color of state law.

Mr. Thomas' challenges the recommendation that Judge Sawaya be
dismissed. He claims that Judge Sawaya also engaged in the alleged
conspiracy.

The Court finds that allegation to be unsupported by

the complaint and adopts the R&R as it pertains to Mr. Thomas'
claim against Judge Sawaya.

Mr. Thomas contends that he enjoys a federally protected
expectation of a parole eligibility hearing and right to the

2

assistance of counsel at that hearing, despite the case lav cited
by the magistrate judge in support of the opposite conclusion. R&R
at 3 and 4.

The Court has the reviewed relevant case law and holds

that the magistrate judge was correct in concluding that there is
no constitutional right to a parole eligibility hearing or to the
assistance of counsel at such a hearing.

Mr. Thomas objects to the R&R, alleging that the magistrate
judge made assumptions concerning who Mr. Thomas was attempting to
sue and in what capacity. He alleges he should have an opportunity
to amend and thereby clarify his complaint. The Court has reviewed
the R&R in light of Mr. Thomas' concern and concludes that the
magistrate judge gave plaintiff the benefit of the doubt at every
turn.

See, for example, R&R at 2.

Therefore, the issues of

defendants' ability to be sued in various capacities having been
resolved, amendment of the complaint is not necessary.1

The Court has reviewed and considered all other arguments
raised by Mr. Thomas and concludes that he has not presented an
arguable claim against any of the named defendants.

The Court

'Plaintiff correctly points out that a party may be stripped of his official representative capacity when he violates clearly established
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pleasant v. Lovell. 876 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989). He then objects to
the magistrate judge's recommendation on the basis that "the Magistrate failed to demonstrate that defendants did not violate plaintifTs
constitutional rights." Mr. Thomas apparently misperceives where the burden of proof lies. It is Mr. Thomas who fails to demonstrate that
defendants' alleged conduct violated his clearly established constitutional rights.

3

adopts the R&R and dismisses plaintiff's complaint as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

The Court also affirms the magistrate

judge's Order denying Mr. Thomas' request for appointment of
counsel.

It is so ORDERED.

DATED this

2#* day of

fL^J

19.fi".
BY THE COURTJ

DAVID SAM
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

4

ADDENDUM F

FIL^D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U n i t e d gfefeg OQUft 3? App»k

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

DEC 0 8 1992
ROBERT L. HOECKER
Clerk

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 92-4072
(D.C. No. 91-CV-1283)
(D. Utah)

v.
DAVID J. ANGERHOFER; ANDREW HUNT;
VICKIE BRIDWALL; PAUL LARSEN; PETE HAUN;
MICHAEL R. SIBBETT; VICTORIA J.
PALACIOS; DONALD BLANCHARD; PAUL
BOYDEN; JAMES SEWEYE; HEATHER N. COOKE;
PAUL SHEFFIELD; ENID 0. PINO; DEAN
SHEFFIELD; PAUL VAN DAM, Attorney
General,
Defendants-Appellees,

)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before MOORE and TACHA,
District Judge.

Circuit

Judges,

and

SAFFELS,**

Senior

••Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States
District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

After examining the briefs and appellate record,

this

panel

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially
assist the determination

of

this

appeal.

See

Fed. R. App. P.

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall
not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit,
except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of
the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R.
36.3.

34(a);

10th

Cir.

R.

34.1.9.

The

case

is

therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Utah prison system, brought
civil

rights

suit

to

redress alleged constitutional violations

arising out of his efforts to obtain release on
appeals

from

a

this

district

court

order

parole.

He

now

dismissing the action as

legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
The magistrate judge and district court

thoroughly

analyzed

the various claims asserted in the complaint, and we concur in the
court's conclusion that they lack the arguable merit necessary
warrant

further

proceedings.

See Neitzke v. Williams. 490 U.S.

319, 327 (1989); Hall v. Bellmon. 935 F.2d 1106, 1109
1991).

We

add

interrelated

the

points

to

following
prompting

comments
much

only

of

to

the

(10th Cir.
clarify

two

discussion

in

plaintiff's appellate brief.
First,

plaintiff emphasizes repeatedly that the Utah Supreme

Court held in Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d
1991),

that

the

state

constitution,

counterpart, grants prisoners due
with

parole

F.2d 1287,
(1984)(no

proceedings.
1289-92

due

Id.

(10th

process

process

unlike
rights

734
its

in

(Utah

federal

connection

at 735; cf. Dock v. Latimer. 729

Cir.),

cert.

denied-

469

U.S. 885

rights enforceable in Utah parole context

under federal constitutional analysis set out

in

Inmates

Complex. 442 U.S. 1

of

Nebraska

(1979)): Houtz v.
1989) (same

result

provisions).

Penal

Deland.
as

in

&

Correctional

718

F.

Dock

Supp.

after

1497,

amendment

Greenholtz

1502

v.

(D. Utah

of Utah parole

Second, plaintiff asserts that the absolute immunity
2

rationale

employed

constitutional
(Board)

and

by

claims
state

the

district

asserted

Judge

court

against

Sawaya

for

the

to

dismiss

Board

of

defendants.

See

(1984)).

against

Schepp v. Fremont County, 900 F.2d 1448,

1452 (10th Cir. 1990) (following Pulliam v. Allen.
541-42

Pardons

failure to comply with or

enforce Foote does not reach the injunctive relief sought
these

the

Together

argument for reinstatement

these
of

466

points

comprise

claims

against

his

U.S. 522,
plaintiff's

these

state

defendants.
While

the Foote decision recognizes some level of procedural

protections in favor of the inmate seeking

parole,

it

does

not

impose any limits on the unfettered discretion vested in the Board
with respect to its
Northern

v.

substantive

Barnes.

825

decisionmaking

authority.

See

P.2d 696, 698-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);

Foote, 808 P.2d at 735. Thus,

Foote

notwithstanding,

plaintiff

has no federal constitutionally cognizable interest in the Board's
determination of

his

parole

status.

See

Jacobs. Visconsi

&

Jacobs. Co. v. City of Lawrence. 927 F.2d 1111, 1116-19 (10th Cir.
1991)(state

procedural

implicating

due

protections

process

rights

do

not

unless

create

they

interests

place substantive

limits on discretionary authority of decisionmaker); Campbell
Mercer.

926

F.2d

990,

993

(10th

Assocs. v. State Traffic

Comm'n.

1991)("the

Clause

Due

Process

v.

Cir. 1991)(same); West Farms

951
does

F.2d

469,

not

protect

472

(2d Cir.

against

the

deprivation of state procedural rights"), cert, denied. 112 S. Ct.
1671

(1992).

possible

Plaintiff's claims based on Foote raise at most the

violation

of

state

law,
3

and

consequently

lack

the

constitutional

foundation

for

a

civil

rights

Oberndorf v. City & County of Denver. 900 F.2d
Cir.),

violation.

1434,

1442

See
(10th

cert, denied. Ill S. Ct. 129 (1990); cf. Brinlee v. Crisp.

608 F.2d 839, 843 (10th Cir. 1979) (state procedural errors do not
present

federal

denied.

444

questions

U.S.

constitute,

in

1047

cognizable

(1980).

essence,

a

on

habeas corpus), cert,

Furthermore,

these

challenge to the merits of the state

court decision approving the procedures followed by the
plaintiff's

claims

Board

case and, as such, seek a species of appellate review

that is beyond the jurisdiction of the federal district court
this

court.

See

Facio

v.

Doe

and

Jones. 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir.

1991); Van Sickle v. Hollowav. 791
1986);

in

F.2d

1431,

1436

(10th Cir.

v. Pringle. 550 F.2d 596, 599 (10th Cir. 1976), cert,

denied. 431 U.S. 916 (1977).

Consequently, the limited

scope

of

defendants' absolute immunity defense does not avail plaintiff, as
he cannot, even with the aid of

the

Foote

decision,

assert

an

arguable claim necessitating invocation of the defense.
For

the

reasons

set

out above, and those expressed by the

district court, the judgment of the United States
for the District of Utah is AFFIRMED.

Court

Pending motions are denied,

and the mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court
John P. Moore
Circuit Judge

4

District

Saffels, Senior District Judge, concurring.

I concur in the result reached by the majority based
applicable

standard

U.S.C. § 1915(d).
§ 1915(d)

Hernandez.

abuse

is

in

recently

noted

f

pauperis

petition.

See

Denton

v.

On appeal, a § 1915(d) dismissal is to be reviewed for an

of

that discretion.

the

district

Id.

In Neitzke v. Williams. 490 U.S.

the

applied

courts for § 1915(d) dismissals on the basis of

legal frivolousness.
with

a

112 S. Ct. 1728# 1734, 118 L.Ed.2d 340

319 (1988), the Supreme Court espoused the standard to be
by

that

entrusted to the discretion of the court

forma

U.S.

the

appellate review for dismissals under 28

The Supreme Court has

dismissal

entertaining the

(1992).

of

on

decision

I cannot join

the

majority

in

concurring

below that none of appellant's claims against

the 15 named defendants had

sufficient

further

Olson v. Hart. 965 F.2d 940, 942 n.3,

proceedings.

See

legal

merit

943 (10th Cir. 1992)(allegations of complaint held

to

warrant

sufficient

to

withstand dismissal under § 1915(d) as legally frivolous); Hall v.
Bellmon. 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991)(concern that pro
litigants

have

notice

legitimate claims
militates

against

Rule 12(b)(6)
Nevertheless,

by

opportunity

amending

equating

dismissal
I

and

cannot

and

say

dismissal of

their

standards

Rule 56
that

avoid

supporting

§ 1915(d)
and

to

se

pleadings

with those for

summary

judgment).

the district court abused its

discretion in dismissing the complaint as

legally

frivolous.

therefore concur in the result reached by the majority.
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